THE “CIRCLE OF ASSENT” DOCTRINE:
AN IMPORTANT INNOVATION IN CONTRACT LAW
Robert M. Lloyd∗
Do you know the difference between education and experience?
Education is when you read the fine print. Experience is what
you get when you don’t.
Pete Seeger
It has been a problem for decades. A business presents a customer with a
standard-form contract. The customer gives the contract the same sort of quick
reading that most people would give it in similar circumstances and signs it. When
something goes wrong, the customer complains, only to be told that she waived
whatever right she is trying to assert when she signed the form without reading the
fine print.
Although scholars have written about this problem for decades,1 the law has
yet to come up with a good solution. The traditional rule was that a person was
bound by what he or she signed, regardless of whether he or she read it or
understood it.2 This rule made sense in the days when signing a standard-form
∗
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It will not do for a man to enter into a contract, and, when called upon to respond
to its obligations, to say that he did not read it when he signed it, or did not know
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contract was an unusual occurrence. Today, however, the old rule needs to be
tempered with a realistic understanding that people who sign form contracts do not
take the time to read them carefully, and that those who present them with the
contracts do not expect them to. The doctrine of unconscionability provides relief
in extreme cases, but many of the one-sided clauses in form contracts cannot
reasonably be characterized as unconscionable; they are just unfair.
Standard-form contracts have once again become the most controversial
issue in contract law.3 Standard-form contracts first aroused interest when the
Uniform Commercial Code was new and business lawyers saw the doctrine of
unconscionability as a threat to freedom of contract.4 But the competing concerns
reached equilibrium within a few years as the courts worked out the contours of
unconscionability.5 Outcomes became fairly predictable, and business lawyers
learned how best to protect their clients. Recently, however, new ways of doing
business have created new problems. Tennessee lawyers should follow the
developments with particular care because Tennessee law has not followed the
national trends, but has developed a unique (and, I believe, superior) way of dealing
with these issues.
This new way of dealing with standard-form contracts is known as the “circle
of assent” doctrine. It was created by the Tennessee courts, and although courts
outside of Tennessee have yet to adopt it to any great extent, the doctrine is close to
the mainstream of established contract law. It is based on well-known ideas
attributed to Karl Llewellyn, the father of the Uniform Commercial Code.6

what it contained. If this were permitted, contracts would not be worth the paper
on which they are written. But such is not the law. A contractor must stand by the
words of his contract; and, if he will not read what he signs, he alone is responsible
for his omission.
Upton v. Tribilcock, 91 U.S. 45, 50 (1875), quoted in DeFord v. Nat’l Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 185 S.W.2d
617, 621 (Tenn. 1945).
See Linda J. Rusch, A History and Perspective of Revised Article 2: The Never Ending Saga of a Search for
Balance, 52 S.M.U. L. REV. 1683, 1690 (1999) (stating that standard-form consumer contracts
generated more comments than any other topic in Article 2 revision process and hampered efforts to
reach consensus); see also infra text accompanying notes 123-91.

3

See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, Unconscionability: A Critical Reappraisal, 18 J. L. & ECON. 293, 305 (1975);
Arthur Allen Leff, Unconscionability and the Code—The Emperor’s New Clause, 115 U. PA. L. REV. 485
(1967); John A. Spanogle, Jr., Analyzing Unconscionability Problems, 117 U. PA. L. REV. 931 (1969).
4

5

See, e.g., E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 4.28 (4th ed. 2004).

6

See infra note 18 and accompanying text.
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As first articulated in Parton v. Mark Pirtle Oldsmobile-Cadillac-Isuzu, Inc.,7 the
“circle of assent” doctrine holds that “the party who signs a printed form furnished
by the other party will be bound by the provisions in the form over which the parties
actually bargained and such other provisions that are not unreasonable in view of the
circumstances surrounding the transaction.”8 The facts of Parton illustrate the way
the doctrine works. The plaintiff, an automobile wholesaler, took a Cadillac to the
defendant, a Cadillac dealership, for repairs.9 He signed the defendant’s preprinted
repair order form, which provided “in small print in the upper left corner:10 I hereby
authorize the repair work hereinafter set forth to be done along with the necessary
material and agree that you are not responsible for loss or damage to the vehicle or
articles left in the vehicle in case of fire, theft, or any other cause beyond your
control….”11
Thieves stole the car from an unfenced and unattended yard where the
defendant’s employees had left it.12 The Tennessee Bureau of Criminal Identification
recovered the car in a damaged condition.13 After the plaintiff won a judgment in
the trial court, the defendant appealed, arguing that the court should have given
effect to the exculpatory language in the repair order.14 Although it was unclear
whether the language in the form was broad enough to cover the negligence in
question,15 the court did not address that issue, but instead chose to base its decision
on the “circle of assent” doctrine.16
To determine whether the fine print exculpatory clause became part of the
contract, the court referred to the writings of Karl Llewellyn, a founder of the Legal
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730 S.W.2d 634 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1987).
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Id. at 637-38.
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Id. at 635.
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Id.

15

Id. at 636.

16

Id. at 638.
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Realist movement and the father of the Uniform Commercial Code:17
Professor Karl Llewellyn has led the effort to arrive at a realistic
determination of the terms of a writing that should bind the parties.
Working in the specific area of contracts for the sale of goods as one
of the principal authors of Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial
Code, Professor Llewellyn fought for some general principles which
we find should be applied to all contract cases. Recognizing that one
of the fundamental concepts of contract law is the concept of assent,
he said:
Instead of thinking about “assent” to boilerplate
clauses, we can recognize that so far as concerns the
specific, there is no assent at all. What has in fact
been assented to, specifically, are the few dickered
terms, and the broad type of the transaction, and but
one [thing] more. That one thing more is a blanket
assent (not a specific assent) to any not unreasonable
or indecent terms the seller may have on his form,
which do not alter or eviscerate the reasonable
meaning of the dickered terms. The fine print which
has not been read has no business to cut under the
meaning of those dickered terms which constitute the
dominant and only real expression of agreement, but
much of it commonly belongs in.18
The court continued, quoting from a contemporary contracts scholar, John Murray,
Chancellor of Duquesne University:
The parties will not be found to have agreed to an abnormal
allocation of risks if the only evidence thereof is an inconspicuous
provision in the boilerplate of the standard form. At a minimum, the
reallocation must be physically conspicuous. Beyond that, it must
have been manifested in a fashion comprehensible to the party
against whom it is sought to be enforced.19
Noting specifically that it was not applying an unconscionability analysis, the
17

See WILLIAM TWINING, KARL LLEWELLYN AND THE REALIST MOVEMENT 270 (1973).

18 Parton, 730 S.W.2d at 637(quoting K. Llewellyn, The Common Law Tradition: Deciding Appeals § 370
(1960) (emphasis in original).
19

Id. (quoting JOHN EDWARD MURRAY, JR., MURRAY ON CONTRACTS § 353 (1974)).
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court summed up its reasoning in a phrase that has become an important part of
Tennessee contract law: “we think it is simply a matter of ascertaining the agreement
of the parties in light of modern notions of fair play: a matter of finding the elusive
‘“circle of assent”’ which contains the agreement of the parties.”20
A year later, the court reiterated the “circle of assent” doctrine in Harriman
School District v. Southwestern Petroleum Corp.21 In that case, a supplier of roofing
materials attempted to rely on warranty disclaimers and limitations on remedies that
were set out in “extremely small print” on the back of an order form.22 After
quoting extensively from Parton,23 the court concluded, “It is...clear that in light of all
the circumstances surrounding the transaction, the inconspicuous, boilerplate,
standard-form, reallocation of material risks was never part of the ‘circle of assent’ of
the transaction.”24
Southwestern Petroleum is significant for several reasons. The opinion came
from the Eastern Section of Tennessee, whereas Parton and most of the cases
following it came from the Middle Section. The Honorable E. Riley Anderson, who
later became Chief Justice of the Tennessee Supreme Court, wrote the opinion.
Moreover, as in Parton, the document in question was not signed by an
unsophisticated consumer, but by a person sophisticated in business dealings, in this
case the superintendent of a school district.25
After these two cases, the “circle of assent” doctrine became such a part of
Tennessee contract jurisprudence that courts found it necessary to discuss the
doctrine even when they rejected its application. In Taylor v. Liberty Mutual Insurance
Co.,26 the Court of Appeals used the “circle of assent” doctrine to reverse a summary
judgment based on a release written on the back of an insurance company settlement
check.27 The court again adopted the language of Chancellor Murray.28 In One Stop
20

Id. at 638.

21

757 S.W.2d 669 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1988).

22

Id. at 674.

23

Id. at 674-75.

24

Id. at 675.

25

Id. at 671.

26

No. 01-A-01-9210-CV-00420, 1994 Tenn. App. LEXIS 31 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 26, 1994).

27

Id. at *14.

28

See id.
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Supply, Inc. v. Ransdell,29 the Court of Appeals distinguished Parton because, among
other things, the contract provision Mr. Ransdell was trying to avoid was written in
capital letters immediately above the signature line.30 Rather than merely
distinguishing Parton on the obvious basis that the language in Parton was in small
print and in an obscure location, the One Stop Supply court discussed the “circle of
assent” doctrine at length, again quoting Professor Llewellyn and Chancellor Murray
and explaining in some detail the factors that go into a determination of whether a
contract provision is within the “circle of assent.”31
Federal courts applying Tennessee contract law have also adopted the “circle
of assent” doctrine. In Davis v. Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co.,32 an employer argued that
an inconspicuous disclaimer in its employee handbook prevented the handbook
from becoming a binding contract between the employer and the employee.33 The
United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee held that the
language did not prevent the formation of a contract because it was not within the
“circle of assent.”34 The court interpreted the Tennessee cases as holding that “some
language within contracts will not be binding if that language is hidden, not pointed
out, and that a person of ordinary intelligence and experience would not expect to
find such a provision within the contract.”35 In Davis, the language in question was
located on the last page of a 52-page booklet. It was in ordinary type with nothing to
highlight or otherwise distinguish it.36
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit further extended
and refined the “circle of assent” doctrine in Curtis v. Ryder TRS Inc.,37 a case
involving a contract signed in Tennessee. The Ninth Circuit held that a warranty
disclaimer in a truck rental contract was not within the “circle of assent” even
29

No. 01-A-01-9509-CV-00403, 1996 Tenn. App. LEXIS 228 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 19, 1996).

30

Id. at *2, *11.

Id. at *7-10. The court’s extended discussion of Parton may have stemmed in part from its belief
that the trial court relied on Parton in reaching its decision that the language in question did not
become part of the contract. Id. at *4.
31

32

743 F. Supp. 1273 (M.D. Tenn. 1990).

33

Id. at 1279-80.

34

Id. at 1280.

35

Id.

36

Id.

37

43 F.App’x 103 (9th Cir. 2002).
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though it met the UCC requirements for being “conspicuous.”38 The Ninth Circuit
pointed out that the disclaimer was in a “Rental Information Folder” separate from
the rental agreement the customer had signed, and even though the signed rental
agreement recited that the customer had read the Rental Information Folder, the
rental agent knew the customer had not read the folder.39 Moreover, although the
rental agreement mentioned, by paragraph number, many of the provisions of the
Rental Information Folder that the rental company apparently deemed important,
the disclaimer was not one of those provisions mentioned in the signed agreement.40
A UNIQUE DOCTRINE
At first glance, the “circle of assent” doctrine may appear to be an offshoot
of the doctrine of unconscionability or of the UCC’s requirement that certain terms
be conspicuous. But it is neither. It is a unique doctrine that Tennessee courts have
developed to make a fair adjustment between two competing needs: a business’s
need to protect itself through language in its contracts and its customers’ needs to
transact business without agonizing over every line of the paperwork.
Unlike unconscionability, which focuses on the fairness of the bargain the
parties have agreed to, the “circle of assent” doctrine focuses on whether the parties
have actually agreed. In its classic form, unconscionability looks at whether the
bargain is “such as no man in his senses…would make on the one hand, and as no
honest and fair man would accept on the other.”41 In unconscionability cases, courts
often look at whether one party was forced to agree to the other’s terms because of
“unequal bargaining power,”42 and courts seldom find contract terms unconscionable
where the complaining party is wealthy or sophisticated.43 The result is that
unconscionability is seldom a viable argument for business signers. This is not the

38

Id. at 104.

39

Id. at 106.

40

Id.

41

Hume v. United States, 132 U.S. 406, 415 (1889).

See, e.g., Mobil Oil Corp. v. Earhart Petroleum, Inc., No. 99-2093, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 8674, at
*13 (4th Cir. May 3, 2000) (“Unconscionability deals primarily with a grossly unequal bargaining
power at the time the contract is formed”); United States v. Martinez, 151 F.3d 68, 74 (2d Cir. 1998)
(“unconscionability seeks to prevent sophisticated parties with ‘grossly unequal bargaining power’
from taking advantage of less sophisticated parties”).

42

There are, of course, exceptions. In Frank’s Maint. & Eng’g, Inc. v. C.A. Roberts Co., 408 N.E.2d 403
(Ill. App. Ct. 1980), a court held a clause limiting remedies to be unconscionable in a business-tobusiness transaction. Id. at 411. Such cases, however, are relatively rare.
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case with the “circle of assent” doctrine. In the first two important “circle of assent”
cases, an automobile wholesaler and a school district (represented in the transaction
by its superintendent) were able to show that terms in the documents they signed
were outside the “circle of assent.”44
In some ways, the “circle of assent” doctrine is more like the UCC’s
requirement that certain terms be conspicuous. But rightly or wrongly, the UCC’s
test for conspicuousness has degenerated into a mechanical test. To create a safe
harbor and reduce litigation, the drafters of the UCC provided that type is
conspicuous “if it is in larger or other contrasting type or color.”45 The result is that
under the UCC you can hide anything you want as long as you put it in capitals or
italics.46 The “circle of assent” doctrine is more nuanced. In Curtis, the Ninth
Circuit held that a warranty disclaimer was conspicuous under the UCC but was still
outside the “circle of assent.”47
Perhaps the closest analogy is the “reasonable expectations” doctrine in
insurance law. As Professor Keeton has explained that doctrine: “The objectively
reasonable expectations of applicants and intended beneficiaries regarding the terms
of insurance contracts will be honored even though painstaking study of the policy
provisions would have negated those expectations.”48 This doctrine has been
adopted in at least 33 states,49 although in practice most of the states have limited its
application to situations in which there is an ambiguity, technical or obscure
language, or a provision hidden in a contract.50

44

See supra text accompanying notes 8-26.

45

U.C.C. § 1-201(10) (2005).

46

As one treatise put it:
Although it is surprisingly extensive, the case law adds virtually nothing to the
statutory language. For all practical purposes, the issue boils down to typeface and
ink color.... [T]he use of a type size larger than or a color different from that used
for the rest of the contract language will virtually always be sufficient to make the
disclaimer or limitation conspicuous.

I THOMAS D. CRANDALL ET AL., UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 7.11.3 (1996).
47

See supra text accompanying note 38.

48

ROBERT E. KEETON, BASIC TEXT ON INSURANCE LAW 351 (1971).

49

See Max True Plastering Co. v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 912 P.2d 861, 866, 870 (Okla. 1996).

50

Id. at 868.
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A TOTALITY OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES TEST
The Ninth Circuit stated that identifying the “[c]ircle of assent…is…a totality
of the circumstances inquiry.”51 This is clearly correct. Although there is language in
some of the Tennessee cases indicating a rule that, where certain elements are
present, a contractual provision will be found to be outside the “circle of assent,”52
even a casual reading of the cases shows that the courts have not applied the
doctrine this way. Instead, the courts have treated the “circle of assent” as a flexible
standard, allowing them to consider a wide variety of factors and to give each factor
the weight the court believes it deserves under the particular circumstances of each
case.53 While the results in the individual cases seem, on the whole, quite sensible,
51

Curtis v. Ryder TRS, Inc., 43 F. App’x 103, 106 (9th Cir. 2002).

52 In Brown v. KareMor Int’l, Inc., No. 01-A-01-9807-CH-00368, 1999 Tenn. App. LEXIS 249 (Tenn. Ct.
App. Apr. 19, 1999), the court said “the burden was on [the party relying on the provision] to show
that the parties actually bargained over the arbitration provision or that it was a reasonable term
considering the circumstances.” Id. at *7-8. On its face, this seems to say that a term cannot shift a
risk away from the drafter unless the term is actually bargained over. But the court goes on to discuss
the fact that the provision was “buried on the reverse side,” indicating that in determining what is “a
reasonable term,” a court should consider not only the substance of the provision but also whether
the party against whom it is being asserted should have been aware of it. Id. at *8. In a similar
fashion, the opinion in Davis v. Conn. Gen. Life Ins. Co., 143 F. Supp. 1273 (M.D. Tenn. 1990),
appeared to state a rule too narrow and too rigid to cover all of the cases in which it has been applied:
“Tennessee recognizes that some language within contracts will not be binding if that language is
hidden, not pointed out, and that a person of ordinary intelligence and experience would not expect
to find such a provision within the contract.” Id. at 1280; cf. Parton v. Mark Pirtle OldsmobileCadillac-Isuzu, Inc., 730 S.W.2d 634, 637 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1987) (referring to “circle of assent” as
“principles”).
53

Judge Richard Posner explained the difference between a rule and a standard like this:
The objection has to do with the difference between rule and standard as methods of
legal governance. A rule singles out one or a few facts and makes it or them
conclusive of legal liability; a standard permits consideration of all or at least most
facts that are relevant to the standard's rationale. A speed limit is a rule; negligence
is a standard. Rules have the advantage of being definite and of limiting factual
inquiry but the disadvantage of being inflexible, even arbitrary, and thus
overinclusive, or of being underinclusive and thus opening up loopholes (or of
being both over- and underinclusive!). Standards are flexible, but vague and openended; they make business planning difficult, invite the sometimes unpredictable
exercise of judicial discretion, and are more costly to adjudicate—and yet when
based on lay intuition they may actually be more intelligible, and thus in a sense
clearer and more precise, to the persons whose behavior they seek to guide than
rules would be. No sensible person supposes that rules are always superior to
standards, or vice versa, though some judges are drawn to the definiteness of rules
and others to the flexibility of standards. But that is psychology; the important
point is that some activities are better governed by rules, others by standards.

246

TRANSACTIONS: THE TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW

[VOL. 7

they do not allow the reader to develop a formula for determining when a provision
is within the “circle of assent.” Nor is there even a limited group of factors, the
presence or absence of which will determine the result in a particular case.
There are, however, two basic considerations: 1) the extent to which the
customer should have been aware of the provision; and 2) the extent to which the
provision shifts to the customer a risk the customer was not expecting. The idea is a
commonsense one. Two parties agree to a deal, usually goods or services in
exchange for money. Normally, little more is said than the price and the basic
outline of what the seller will provide. One person, most often the seller, presents a
standard form, which the parties sign. (For convenience, we will call the person who
presents the standard form the “seller” and the person who signs the seller’s
standard form the “customer,” but it should be understood that the roles might
actually be reversed, as where an employee signs her employer’s standard form or a
seller of goods signs the buyer’s standard form.)
In even the simplest business transaction, a number of details and
contingencies need to be addressed. The customer has to be bound by the terms in
the document, even the terms in fine print.54 But fairness requires that the drafter of
the standard form should not be allowed to trick the customer by hiding important
terms (“deal points”) in the fine print.
It would be possible to take a mechanical approach to applying this policy.
One could require that the deal points be conspicuous and allow the so-called
“housekeeping details” to be less prominent.55 The Uniform Commercial Code has
adopted a similar rule requiring certain provisions to be “conspicuous” (a term of art
under the UCC)56 and requiring others to be separately signed.57 Wisely, courts

MindGames, Inc. v. W. Publ’g Co., 218 F.3d 652, 656-57 (7th Cir. 2000) (emphasis in original).
If we were to bind people only to those terms to which they specifically agreed, we would end up
with a comical situation where each paragraph in a contract is separately initialed and the customer
initials
without
reading.
For
an
example
of
such
a
contract
see
http://www.thesmokinggun.com/graphics/art3/tristacontract1.gif (last visited Jan. 27, 2006) (17page contract between Trista Rehn and Syndicated Productions, Inc., governing Ms. Rehn’s
appearance on the reality television series The Bachelorette).

54

55 This would of course lead to endless litigation about which were “deal points” and which were
“housekeeping details.”

See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-2-316(2) (2001) (requiring disclaimers of warranties of
merchantability and fitness for a particular purpose to be conspicuous).

56

See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-2-205 (2001) (requiring firm offers to be separately signed when on
form supplied by merchant offeree).

57
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applying the “circle of assent” analysis have not taken such an approach. Instead,
they have looked at a wide variety of factors and asked, in effect: Considering the
importance of this term, has the customer been given sufficient opportunity to read
and understand it?58 The courts apply a sliding scale—the more important the term,
the more clearly its import must be brought to the customer’s attention.59
A key ingredient of the analysis is that the party relying on the term must
prove that it is within the “circle of assent.” Unlike unconscionability analysis, where
the party attempting to avoid or limit the term must show why the term is
unconscionable,60 Tennessee case law places upon the person seeking to enforce a
provision “the burden of showing the parties ‘actually bargained over the…provision
or that it was a reasonable term considering the circumstances.’”61
What follows is a discussion of factors courts have considered in determining
whether a term is within the “circle of assent.” There is some overlap among the
factors, and the list is by no means exclusive. Courts can and will look at any fact or
circumstance relevant to the question of whether it is fair to bind a person to a
particular term in the other party’s form agreement.62
Size and Location of the Provision
The size and location of the provision in question is clearly a major factor in
determining whether it is within the “circle of assent,” but the more recent cases
make clear that it is not always determinative.63

58

See infra text accompanying notes 63-116.

59

Id.

60 There are limited exceptions. For instance, UCC § 2-719(3) (2003) provides that a limitation on
consequential damages for injury to the person is prima facie unconscionable in a sale of consumer
goods.
61 Howell v. NHC Healthcare-Fort Sanders, Inc., 109 S.W.3d 731, 735 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003) (quoting
Brown v. KareMor Int’l, No. 01-A-01-9807-CH-00368, 1999 Tenn. App. LEXIS 249, at *8 (Tenn. Ct.
App. April 19, 1999)). Although the Howell opinion does not mention the “circle of assent” doctrine
by name, it clearly seems to be applying it. Brown, which Howell quotes, discusses the “circle of assent”
doctrine at length.

There is nothing in the doctrine that necessarily limits it to standard-form agreements.
Nevertheless, where the deal is so unique and important that one party drafts a contract especially for
that deal, it would take very extraordinary circumstances to justify the other party’s not paying close
attention to every term.
62

63

See infra text accompanying notes 70-78.
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Small print certainly increases the likelihood that a court will find that the
provision is outside the “circle of assent.” In Parton, the provision was in “small
print in the upper left corner” of the document.64 To emphasize how inconspicuous
the language was, the court included a copy of the repair order as an appendix to its
opinion.65 Similarly, in Curtis, the court, noting that the warranty disclaimer was in
seven-point type, found that the disclaimer was outside the “circle of assent.”66 In
Taylor, the release written on the insurance company draft was in small print, and the
size of the print undoubtedly offset, at least to some degree, the fact that it was
written immediately above the line on which the plaintiff and her husband had to
sign in order to endorse the draft.67
The location of the clause in the document also plays an important role. If
the clause is on the back of a form and the signature line is on the front, the chances
of the clause being enforced decrease. The drafter can offset this in part by stating
on the front of the document, preferably immediately above the signature line, that
the signer has read and understood the provisions on the reverse side of the page.
The more prominent this statement, the better, but it is still not as good as having
everything on the front of the form.68 Courts understand that people are less likely
to read provisions on the back, particularly when the transaction is the kind they
enter into without a great deal of thought. In Southwestern Petroleum, the court refused
to give effect to a disclaimer and merger clause on the reverse side of an order form,
noting that it was “in extremely small print.”69 This helped overcome the fact that
the signer was the superintendent of a school district, perhaps the most sophisticated
signer in a “circle of assent” case.
Small print on the back of a form, however, does not necessarily exclude a
provision from the “circle of assent.” In Contour Medical Technology, Inc. v. Flexcon
64

Parton v. Mark Pirtle Oldsmobile-Cadillac-Isuzu, Inc., 730 S.W.2d 634, 635 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1987).

65 A later decision, distinguishing Parton, also noted that in Parton the provision in question was in the
“corner of a form that was not designed to be read sequentially.” One Stop Supply, Inc. v. Ransdell,
No. 01-A-01-9509-CV-00403, 1996 Tenn. App. LEXIS 228, at *11 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 19, 1996).
66

Curtis v. Ryder TRS, Inc., 43 F.App’x 103, 106 (9th Cir. 2002).

Taylor v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., No. 01-A-01-9210-CV-00420, 1994 Tenn. App. LEXIS 31, at *3, *8
(Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 26, 1994).
67

In Brown v. KareMor Int’l, Inc., No 01-A-01-9807-CH-00368, 1999 Tenn. App. LEXIS 249 (Tenn.
Ct. App. Apr. 19, 1999), the Court of Appeals, citing Parton, refused to give effect to language buried
in small print on the back of the form. Id. at *8. The front of the form contained a statement that the
signer had read the back, but it, too, was in “very small print” and was not set off by itself. Id. at *3.
68

69

Harriman Sch. Dist. v. S.W. Petroleum, 757 S.W.2d 669, 674-75 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1988).
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Co.,70 a company that bought adhesive strips claimed that the seller’s provisions
limiting remedies fell outside the “circle of assent.”71 There were two such
provisions in the documents. One was buried in twenty-four numbered “Terms and
Conditions” in “fine but readable print” on the back of an acknowledgment form
mailed to the buyer the same day the goods were shipped.72 The court noted that a
provision on the front of the form, although not particularly prominent, stated that
the order was subject to the terms and conditions on the reverse side.73 The court
gave effect to the provision, saying that “[t]he acknowledgment drew attention to the
terms on the reverse side.”74 The Contour Medical court did not base its holding
entirely on the language on the back of the acknowledgment but relied more heavily
on similar language in bold face type on an invoice that was shipped with the
goods.75 What makes it clear, however, that the language on the back of the
acknowledgment would have been sufficient in itself is the way the court
distinguished Parton: “Although there is no document signed by the plaintiff, there
was a plain notice on the face of the acknowledgment that terms and conditions
appeared on the reverse.”76
Contour Medical should not be read too broadly, however. A key factor was
that the court did not think the provision shifted a risk to the customer. The court
felt that the provision, an exclusion of consequential damages, was a common
provision that a commercial buyer should expect to find in a sales contract.77 The
court indicated that the outcome might have been different if the provision excluded
“actual damages.”78

70

No. 01A01-9707-CH-00315, 1998 Tenn. App. LEXIS 314 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 6, 1998).

71

Id. at *5.

72

Id. at *3-4.

73

Id. at *3.

74

Id. at *9.

75

Id.

76

Id. at *14-15.

77

Id. at *10.

Id. at *15. By “actual damages,” the court means direct damages (as opposed to consequential
damages). The direct damages in this case were the amount (less than $2,000) the buyer paid for the
goods (adhesive used in the manufacture of disposable electrodes for electrocardiograms). Id. at *2,
*5. If the buyer had discovered the defect before using the adhesive in the manufacture of the
electrodes and if it could have obtained another adhesive in time, it would have been made whole if it
recovered the damages permitted by the contract. But if, as seems likely, the defect had been
78
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Placing the provision in a document that the customer does not actually sign
also reduces the likelihood it will be enforced.79 This is just common sense. People
are less likely to read carefully documents that they do not actually sign. While
having the language in an unsigned document is not always fatal,80 drafters should
make sure the terms they really want in the agreement are in the documents that the
customer signs.
Readability of the Language
The more readable the provision, the more likely it is to be found within the
“circle of assent.” Conversely, where the provision is written in technical legal
terminology, it may be outside the “circle of assent” if the customer is not the kind
of person who would be expected to understand the language on a casual reading.
Two courts interpreting Tennessee law have quoted Chancellor Murray’s statement
that the provision “must have been manifested in a fashion comprehensible to the
party against whom it is sought to be enforced.”81
Often the problem with making the provision comprehensible to an
unsophisticated customer is not in the language itself, but in the
customer’s understanding of the consequences. Unlike lawyers, who
are trained to think through the consequences of a provision (and still
too often fail to foresee the consequences), an unsophisticated
layperson will often fail to see the potentially serious consequences of
a seemingly innocuous provision. In these circumstances, an
example will often help. Take, for instance, the typical anti-waiver
clause in a consumer loan contract: “If lender shall fail to exercise any
right granted to it under this contract, that shall not act as a waiver of
any further rights of lender hereunder.” In most cases, it will be hard
discovered only after the electrodes had been shipped to the doctors and hospitals that were the end
users, then the damages the buyer suffered would be many times the “actual damages” the court
allowed it to recover. Still, limitations on remedies like the one in question are common, and a
business buyer should expect to see such a clause in a seller’s form and should expect to have to
bargain (and perhaps pay a premium price) to get it removed.
See, e.g., Curtis v. Ryder TRS, Inc., 43 F.App’x 103, 106 (9th Cir. 2002) (disclaimer in separate
folder); Harriman Sch. Dist. v. S.W. Petroleum, 757 S.W.2d 669, 676 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1988)
(disclaimer was on document attached to card customer signed; court emphasized that there was no
disclaimer language on the card actually signed).

79

See, e.g,. Contour Med. Tech., Inc. v. Flexcon Co., Inc., No. 01A01-9707-CH-00315, 1998 Tenn.
App. LEXIS 314, at *9 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 6, 1998) (court relied on clause in bold type on invoices).

80

See Curtis, 43 F. App’x at 107; Parton v. Mark Pirtle Oldsmobile-Cadillac-Isuzu, Inc., 730 S.W.2d
634, 637 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1987); see also JOHN EDWARD MURRAY, JR., MURRAY ON CONTRACTS § 353
(1974).
81
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to argue that a blue-collar worker buying a truck would understand
that this means if the lender accepts late payments five months in a
row, it can nevertheless repossess his truck just because the sixth
payment is late. But suppose the clause provides something like this:
Payments must be made on time. We are not obligated to accept late
payments. If we do accept a late payment, this does not give you the
right to make payments late in the future. In the same way, we may
from time to time fail to exercise certain of our rights under this
contract (such as the right to repossess the vehicle if your payments
are late). This does not prevent us from exercising those rights at any
time in the future.
Such a provision may be more understandable to the average customer.
Length of the Document
The longer the document, the more likely it is that any particular provision
will be outside the “circle of assent.” In Curtis, the disclaimer held to be outside the
“circle of assent” was part of a five-page folder.82 In Davis, the employee handbook
was 52 pages long, and this was certainly a factor in the court’s determination that
the disclaimer of contractual liability was outside the “circle of assent.”83
In considering the length of the document, a court should of course take into
account the sophistication of the reader and the size of the transaction. A person
buying a car should be expected to read more carefully than that same person would
when renting a car for the weekend.
Headings–Warning the Reader or Misleading Her
Headings can be a useful device for making sure the reader sees the
important provisions in a contract. But headings can also be misleading, and
misleading headings have played a part in several cases. While most of these lapses
probably resulted from drafting oversights rather than conscious efforts to mislead, it
is hard to blame courts for being suspicious of the drafters’ motives, or for at least
giving the customer the benefit of the doubt.
In Southwestern Petroleum, the court noted that the disclaimer and merger
clause on which the defendant relied were in a block under the heading

82 Curtis v. Ryder TRS, Inc., No. 98-1054-KI, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14665, at *12 (D. Or. Oct. 4,
2000).
83

See Davis v. Conn. Gen. Life Ins. Co., 743 F. Supp. 1273, 1280 (M.D. Tenn. 1990).
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“Conditions.”84 In Curtis, the paragraph containing the warranty disclaimer was
headed “Vehicle Condition.”85 In Parton, the disclaimer of liability was under the
heading “Terms cash unless arrangements made.”86
In a consumer transaction, the document’s title and headings should make it
clear that the document is in fact a legal document that the customer should consider
carefully. In Curtis, the court noted that the disclaimer was “within a folder that
begins with reassuring statements, in large type, such as ‘Let Ryder Take a Load Off
Your Mind’ and ‘One way we can thank you for choosing Ryder is to make your
move as easy as possible.’”87 In an analogous context, courts have been less willing
to hold a contract unconscionable when it had a conspicuous provision saying it was
a contract and advising the signer to seek legal advice before signing it.88
Sophistication of the Customer
In a number of “circle of assent” cases, the courts have taken into account
the customer’s sophistication or lack thereof. The more sophisticated the customer,
the more likely a provision is to be within the “circle of assent.” As with all the
other factors, this one is not determinative in and of itself. The first two published
opinions holding a provision outside the “circle of assent” both involved apparently
sophisticated signers–an automobile wholesaler89 and a school superintendent.90 Still,
the more sophisticated the reader, the harder it is to argue that they can be excused
for not having read and understood the provision. In One Stop Supply, Inc. v.
Ransdell,91 the court rejected the customer’s contention that the clause in question
“would not be clear to the average reader,” saying, “While we would be reluctant to
present the disputed clause as a model of clarity, we believe that if a knowledgeable
businessman like Mr. Ransdell actually read it, he would easily recognize that it
purports to hold him personally responsible for the debts of his company.”92
84

Harriman Sch. Dist. v. S.W. Petroleum, 757 S.W.2d 669, 674 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1988).

85

Curtis, 43 F. App’x at 106.

86

Parton, 730 S.W.2d at 638.

87

Curtis, 43 F. App’x at 106.

88

See, e.g., Zapatha v. Dairy Mart, Inc., 408 N.E.2d 1370, 1377 (Mass. 1980).

89

See Parton, 730 S.W.2d at 635.

90

See Harriman Sch. Dist. v. S.W. Petroleum, 757 S.W.2d 669, 672 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1988).

91

No. 01-A-01-9509-CV-00403, 1996 Tenn. App. LEXIS 228 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 19, 1996).

92

Id. at *10.
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This raises a difficult question. Is it the sophistication of the individual
signer or that of some hypothetical average reader that the court should take into
account in determining whether the provision is within the “circle of assent?”
Contour Medical is in accord with One Stop Supply in applying a different standard
where the signer is sophisticated.93 Chancellor Murray seems to agree, saying that the
term “must have been manifested in a fashion comprehensible to the party against
whom it is sought to be enforced.”94
On the other hand, some opinions talk about whether “a person of ordinary
intelligence and experience” would expect to find the term in the document.95 But if
this standard were applied in all cases, it would be contrary to the clearly expressed
reasoning in One Stop Supply and Contour Medical.96 Perhaps the best way to deal with
the issue is to say that the customer will be presumed to be a person of normal
intelligence, education, and experience commensurate with the expected signers of
the form. The person relying on the term in the form will be allowed to show that
the customer is in fact more sophisticated than the norm and should be held to a
higher standard. If the customer is less sophisticated than the norm, this should only
be taken into account to the extent the seller’s agent knew (or should have known)
of the customer’s situation. This requires businesses to make their contracts
comprehensible to their normal customers, but does not require them to spend
additional money to make them comprehensible to types of customers with whom
they will not normally deal.
Conditions Under Which The Customer Assents
Whether the customer had the opportunity to review the document at her
leisure also factors into the “circle of assent” calculus. What might be reasonable
disclosure in a document that the customer receives at home and has the opportunity
to read in a relaxed atmosphere might be inadequate where the customer has to read
the document with a salesperson distracting her or while she is standing in line at a
car rental counter, for instance, with a line of impatient people waiting behind her.97
93 See Contour Med. Tech., Inc. v. Flexcon Co., Inc., No. 01A01-9707-CH-00315, 1998 Tenn. App.
LEXIS 314, at *10 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 6, 1998) (“We are dealing with a transaction between
commercial entities, sophisticated parties that buy and sell goods with regularity.”)
94

MURRAY, supra note 81, quoted in Parton, 730 S.W.2d at 637.

Davis v. Conn. Gen. Life Ins. Co., 743 F. Supp. 1273, 1280 (M.D. Tenn. 1990); Taylor v. Liberty
Mut. Ins. Co., No. 01-A-01-9210-CV-004220, 1994 Tenn. App. LEXIS 31, at *15 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan.
26, 1994).

95

96

See supra text accompanying notes 93-95.

97

It has been noted, perhaps with some hyperbole, that “in most cases involving a written contract or
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The Court of Appeals recognized this in One Stop Supply, pointing out that the
customer took the credit application home and “had an ample opportunity to read it
and study its provisions.”98 The court contrasted Parton, in which there was no
indication the customer had any such opportunity.99
In Terry v. Ober Gatlinburg, Inc.,100 the court appeared to think the fact that the
exculpatory language was contained in two conspicuous places, both of which the
customer had to sign, overcame the fact that “he signed the document in the hurried
and congested environment of the [ski equipment] rental line and the entire process
took place in less than ninety seconds.”101 The court cited Parton but then pointed
out the conspicuousness of the exculpatory language.102 The court vacated a
summary judgment based on the document, but it appears that the decision was
based primarily on the ambiguities in the document rather than on the customer’s
argument that the language was outside the “circle of assent.”103
Substantive Fairness of the Provision
Another factor that must be considered is how fair the substantive terms of
the questioned clause are in the context of the transaction as a whole. In Parton and
several other cases, the courts have quoted Karl Llewellyn’s statement that a party
who signs a standard-form contract assents not only to the “dickered terms,” but
also to any “not unreasonable or indecent terms…which do not alter or eviscerate
the reasonable meaning of the dickered terms.”104

agreement, [consumers] are told to ‘just sign by the Xs’ and have no opportunity to read the
document.” Yvonne W. Rosmarin, Consumers-R-Us: A Reality in the U.C.C. Article 2 Revision Process, 35
WM. & MARY L. REV. 1593, 1597 (1994).
One Stop Supply, Inc. v. Ransdell, No. 01-A-01-9509-CV-00403, 1996 Tenn. App. LEXIS 228, at
*9 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 19, 1996).

98

99 Id.; see also Curtis v. Ryder TRS, Inc., 43 F.App’x 103, 106 (9th Cir. 2002) (discussing importance of
this factor in One Stop Supply).
100

No. 03A01-9701-CV-00026, 1998 Tenn. App. LEXIS 76 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 3, 1998).

101

Id. at *2, *13-14.

102

Id. at *13-14.

103

Id. at *14-16.

Parton v. Mark Pirtle Oldsmobile-Cadillac-Isuzu, Inc., 730 S.W.2d 634, 637 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1987)
(quoting KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS 370 (1960)); see
also One Stop Supply, 1996 Tenn. App. LEXIS 228, at *7.
104
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What is “reasonable” or “decent,” however, is itself another standard, with its own
set of factors. Chancellor Murray’s statement, quoted in some of the cases, seems to
offer the best guide to what is reasonable or decent:
It must be emphasized that the assent analysis is not premised upon
the actual assent of the parties. Parties to a contract rarely
consciously advert to any number of terms which are binding upon
them. If such terms allocate the risks of the bargain in a manner
which the parties should have reasonably expected, they are
enforceable…. The parties will not be found to have agreed to an
abnormal allocation of risks if the only evidence thereof is an
inconspicuous provision in the boilerplate of the standard form.105
In almost all of the cases in which a provision has been found outside the
“circle of assent,” one can fairly say that the provision shifted a risk from the party
who wrote the form to its customer.106 But the risk does not have to be a risk the
parties would have considered significant if they had thought about it when they
made the contract. As has often been noted, when people make contracts, they are
seldom thinking about default or disaster.107 So the fact that it would have cost Mr.
Parton a trivial sum to insure his car against loss at the dealer’s yard does not justify
the dealer shifting that loss to Mr. Parton in the fine print.108 This risk, however, was
nowhere near as great as the risk that Ms. Taylor (the plaintiff who signed the draft
containing language releasing unknown claims)109 would have unknown injuries, so
we should expect that courts will require much less prominence of the contract
terms in a case like Parton than in a case like Taylor.110

105

MURRAY, supra note 81, quoted in Parton, 730 S.W.2d at 637.

In Brown v. KareMor Int’l, Inc., No 01-A-01-9807-CH-00368, 1999 Tenn. App. LEXIS 249 (Tenn.
Ct. App. Apr. 19, 1999) the provision, an arbitration clause that required a Tennessee resident to
arbitrate a small claim in Carson City, Nevada, had the effect of depriving the customer of any
remedy. Id. at *8.
106

107

See, e.g., Step-Saver Data Sys., Inc. v. Wyse Tech., 939 F.2d 91, 99 (3d Cir. 1991).

108

See supra text accompanying notes 9-11.

109

See supra text accompanying note 27; infra text accompanying notes 114-15.

Mr. Parton’s presumed greater sophistication would also be a factor. See supra text accompanying
notes 92-94.

110
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Whether the Provision Was Expected
Even if the provision shifted to the customer a loss that the drafter of the
form would have borne under the law’s default rule, the provision may be within the
“circle of assent” simply because the customer should have expected such a
provision in the contract. In Contour Medical, the court stated as alternative support
for its holding that, even if the terms were not specifically accepted, “they still fall
within the circle of assent because they are reasonable in view of the circumstances
surrounding the transaction.”111 It went on to say that “[l]imitation of damages
clauses are part of the world in which [business people like the plaintiff] operate.”112
Approaching the question of the parties’ expectations in a different way, one
court noted that in Parton the primary subject matter of the contract was the repair of
the car, whereas the provision the Parton court refused to enforce—liability for theft
of the car—bore “only a tangential relationship to the terms over which the parties

Contour Med. Tech., Inc. v. Flexcon Co., Inc., No. 01A01-9707-CH-00315, 1998 Tenn. App.
LEXIS 314, at *9-*10 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 6, 1998).
111

Id. at *10. Courts in other jurisdictions have viewed such clauses differently. The Appellate Court
of Illinois held such a clause unconscionable where it was in small type on the back of an
acknowledgment form, saying:
112

To be part of the bargain, a provision limiting the defendant’s liability must, unless
incorporated into the contract through prior course of dealings or trade usage, have
been bargained for, brought to the purchaser’s attention or be conspicuous. If not,
the seller has no reasonable expectation that the remedy was being so restricted and
the restriction cannot be said to be part of the agreement of the parties. Nor does
the mere fact that both parties are businessmen justify the utilization of unfair
surprise to the detriment of one of the parties since the [Uniform Commercial]
Code specifically provides for the recovery of consequential damages and an
individual should be able to rely on their existence in the absence of being
informed to the contrary either directly or constructively through prior course of
dealings or trade usage.
Frank’s Maint. & Eng’g, Inc. v. C.A. Roberts Co., 408 N.E.2d 403, 410 (Ill. App. Ct. 1980) (citations
omitted). The Parton court seems to have assumed that the customer, himself an auto wholesaler,
would not have expected to find a clause absolving the repairer of liability for loss or damage to the
vehicle. In fact, such clauses are the norm in vehicle repair orders, both in the forms of
manufacturer-associated dealers and those of independent repair shops. See forms on file with author.
An automotive professional with thirty years experience in the business informed the author that the
purpose of such provisions is to shift the risk to the customer’s insurer because most auto repair
customers have insurance (commonly known as “comprehensive insurance”) covering such risks.
Interview with Bob Wolfenbarger, sales associate, Rusty Wallace Honda, in Knoxville, Tenn. (Aug. 5,
2005). Wholesalers like Mr. Parton, however, commonly self insure.
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actually bargained.”113
In Taylor, the provision in question was a release written on the back of a
draft immediately above the line on which the plaintiff and her husband signed to
endorse the draft.114 While other courts have been reluctant to allow people to avoid
provisions directly above the signature line, the Taylor court held that there was at
least a question of fact as to whether “a person of ordinary intelligence and
experience…should have expected that she would be waiving all her claims…by
endorsing and cashing the draft.”115
The fact that the term in question was not expected is of course not decisive
in itself,116 but it is an important factor to be weighed in the totality of the
circumstances.
THE “CIRCLE OF ASSENT” AND THE DUTY TO READ
The “circle of assent” doctrine conflicts with the traditional rule that a
person is bound by the documents he or she signs, regardless of whether he or she
has read them or understood them.117 The courts have not dealt well with the
apparent contradiction between the traditional rule, often expressed as an absolute,
and the “circle of assent” doctrine. In Parton, the court quoted strong language from
a 1945 Tennessee Supreme Court opinion reiterating the traditional rule and
contrasted it with Savoy Hotel Corp. v. Sparks,118 a 1967 case in which the Court of
Appeals held that language on a garage’s claim check form was not effective to
One Stop Supply, Inc. v. Ransdell, No. 01-A-01-9509-CV-00403, 1996 Tenn. App. LEXIS 228, at
*8-9; see also Davis v. Conn. Gen. Life Ins. Co., 743 F. Supp. 1273, 1280 (M.D. Tenn. 1990)
(“Tennessee recognizes that some language within contracts will not be binding if that language is
hidden, not pointed out, and that a person of ordinary intelligence and experience would not expect
to find such a provision within the contract”).

113

114 Taylor v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., No. 01-A-01-9210-CV-00420, 1994 Tenn. App. LEXIS 31, at *3-4.
Although the court does not specifically say so, the opinion implies that the draft, like most insurance
company drafts, looked very much like a bank check and would have normally been treated by the
payee as if it were a check. See id. at *13.
115

Id. at *15.

A business person signing a credit application on behalf of his closely-held corporation does not
expect to become personally liable, but this did not stop the court in One Stop Supply from holding Mr.
Ransdell liable where the term was prominently displayed, he was an experienced business person, and
he had ample opportunity to study the document. See One Stop Supply, 1996 Tenn. App. LEXIS at
*10-12.
116

117

See supra note 2 and accompanying text.

118

421 S.W.2d 98 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1967).
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exculpate the garage for liability when a car parked in the garage was stolen.119 The
Parton opinion then went on to quote Murray and Llewellyn on “decent terms” and
the “circle of assent.”120 It concluded by adopting the “circle of assent” doctrine as
the rule when one party signs a form furnished by the other.121 This would seem to
imply that the old rule of “you’re bound by what you sign” does not apply to
standard forms, and it would have been best if the later cases had left it at that,
saying that with standard forms, you are bound by whatever is within the “circle of
assent.” But in One-Stop Supply, the court said that Parton and the other “circle of
assent” cases “involved exceptional circumstances that enabled us to relieve the
signatories from the normal rule that a party is bound by all the provisions of a
written contract that he signs.”122 This language is unfortunate because it implies
that the “circle of assent” doctrine applies only in exceptional circumstances. This is
hardly the case because many, perhaps most, consumer contracts (as well as many
business-to-business contracts) contain provisions that could be held outside the
“circle of assent.”
APPLYING THE “CIRCLE OF ASSENT” TO THE CURRENT
PROBLEMS IN CONTRACT LAW
While the “circle of assent” doctrine has been around a long time, it has not
yet worked its way fully into Tennessee contract practice. Many of the standard
forms used in Tennessee fail to account for the “circle of assent” doctrine and
therefore risk having key provisions ruled unenforceable because of it. In this
section I will analyze some current issues in contract law under “circle of assent”
analysis.
Arbitration Clauses
Although the Federal Arbitration Act123 generally preempts state laws and
policies regarding arbitration,124 state contract law controls when the question is

119 See Parton v. Mark Pirtle Oldsmobile-Cadillac-Isuzu, Inc., 730 S.W.2d 634, 636-37 (Tenn. Ct. App.
1987) (quoting DeFord v. Nat’l Life & Accident Ins. Co., 185 S.W.2d 617 (Tenn. 1945)).
120

Id. at 637.

121

See id. at 637-38.

One Stop Supply, Inc. v. Ransdell, No. 01-A-01-9509-CV-00403, 1996 Tenn. App. LEXIS 228, at
*4-5 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 19, 1996).

122

123

9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (2005).

124

See Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 10 (1984).
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whether the parties actually agreed to arbitration.125 This makes the “circle of assent”
doctrine an ideal vehicle for dealing with the arbitration provisions that are becoming
more common in consumer contracts, employment contracts, and the like.126
People challenging arbitration clauses in Tennessee have had a difficult time.
Courts in other jurisdictions have been willing to hold arbitration clauses
unconscionable in a variety of situations.127 Tennessee courts, however, have been
willing to find that there was a contract of adhesion or an inequality in bargaining
power only where the complaining party was unable to get what it was seeking from
another source.128 Where a car salesperson who had been working for a dealership
for ten years was told that he had to agree to arbitrate all employment-related claims
or lose his job, the Sixth Circuit, applying Tennessee law, said that in order to show
that the contract was an adhesion contract, the employee had to show “that other
employers would not hire him.”129
The difficulty of prevailing on an unconscionability argument makes the
“circle of assent” doctrine particularly useful. “Circle of assent” analysis allows
courts to enforce agreed-to arbitration provisions while still protecting against those
that are abusive. The business that really cares about arbitration can be reasonably
sure its arbitration clause will be enforced if it drafts a fair arbitration clause and
makes the clause prominent in the document. The clause should warn the customer
that the customer is giving up its right to a jury trial and its right to bring a class
action. If the drafter wants extra insurance that the arbitration clause will be
See Doctor’s Assocs. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 686-87 (1996) (quoting Allied-Bruce Terminix
Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 281 (1995)).
125

126 One article claims that the majority of consumer contracts now contain arbitration clauses. Jean R.
Sternlight & Elizabeth J. Jensen, Mandatory Arbitration: Using Arbitration To Eliminate Consumer Class
Actions: Efficient Business Practice or Unconscionable Abuse?, 67 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 75, 75 (2004).
127 See, e.g., Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Mantor, 335 F.3d 1101, 1109 (9th Cir. 2003) (finding arbitration
clause unconscionable in employment contract); Ting v. AT&T, 319 F.3d 1126, 1152 (9th Cir. 2003)
(holding arbitration clause unconscionable in telephone contract); Flores v. Transamerica Homefirst,
Inc., 113 Cal. Rptr. 2d 376, 382 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001) (holding arbitration clause unconscionable in
loan agreement).
128

See Buraczynski v. Eyring, 919 S.W.2d 314, 320 (Tenn. 1996).

129

Howell v. Rivergate Toyota, Inc., 144 F. App’x 475, 478 (6th Cir. 2005).

One situation where courts have been willing to hold that the contract was an adhesion
contract and that the customer did not have bargaining power is where the contract is for health care
services. See, e.g., Buraczynski, 919 S.W.2d at 320. In Buraczynski, the court held that a patientphysician arbitration agreement was a contract of adhesion, but it enforced the contract nonetheless
because it contained no oppressive provisions. See id. at 321.
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enforced, she can put the arbitration provision in a separate document to be
separately signed by the customer.130
In many cases, the drafter will not want to go to these lengths. Often, there
will be other provisions the drafter wants to highlight, such as warranty disclaimers,
merger clauses, damage limitations, etc.131 Having too many provisions in bold or
separately signed detracts from the impact of each.132 Moreover, it interferes with
the process of doing business, it costs money, and in a small transaction, it may make
the customer decide to take her business elsewhere to avoid all the hassle.
To some extent, the drafter who for these reasons chooses not to highlight
her arbitration clause should bear an increased risk that the clause will not be
enforced. Because the “circle of assent” test is a totality of the circumstances test,
however, it allows a court to put things in perspective. An employee should not be
held to have given up her right to a jury trial on her age discrimination or sexual
harassment claims because of a clause buried in the employee handbook; however, a
court may well decide that a person spending $500 for a computer was bound to
arbitration by a less-than-prominent clause in the machine’s documentation.133
On the other hand, a court applying “circle of assent” analysis might also
decide that the small size of the transaction means the customer has less obligation
to read through the documentation to discover a provision that shifts the risk. In
any event, the drafter of the form can have reasonable assurance it will get the
arbitration it desires if it is willing to pay the price by making the provision fair and
by making it prominent in the document.

In a number of Tennessee cases, the court has noted as a factor in upholding arbitration provisions
the fact that the provision was a separately-signed agreement. See, e.g., Howell, 144 F. App’x at 479-80;
Pyburn v. Bill Heard Chevrolet, 63 S.W.3d 351, 359 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001). But see Walker v. Ryan’s
Family Steak Houses, Inc., 400 F.3d 370, 373 (6th Cir. 2005) (arbitration agreement was one of a
packet of forms that managers routinely had employees sign without reading).
130

The UCC requires that warranty disclaimers be conspicuous. See TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 47-2316(2), 47-2A-214(2) (2005).

131

132 In Raiteri ex rel. Cox v. NHC Healthcare/Knoxville, Inc., No. E2003-00068-COA-R9-CV, 2003 Tenn.
App. LEXIS 957 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 30, 2003), the court, holding an arbitration provision
unenforceable, remarked on the fact that the provision was not required to be signed separately
although several other provisions in the same form contract were. Id. at *12.
133 See Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F.3d 1147, 1148, 1151 (7th Cir. 1997). While the court in that
case was not applying a “circle of assent” analysis, it seems to have been influenced by its perception
that the rights the customers were giving up were not particularly important rights and that the costs
of ensuring informed consent were large in relation to the size of the transaction. Id. at 1148-49.
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Rolling Contracts
The so-called “rolling contract” is arguably the most controversial
development in contract law in many decades.134 As a leading commentator explains,
“A rolling contract is a deal in which the contract either is not formed until, or is
modified when, the last terms are presented for assent.”135 How a rolling contract
works is best illustrated by a summary of the leading (and most controversial) case,
Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc.136 Rich and Enza Hill bought a computer from Gateway by
ordering it over the telephone and charging it to their credit card.137 When the
computer arrived, it was accompanied by a document that contained the terms of the
sale and provided that the Hills were bound by the terms unless they returned the
computer within 30 days.138 Among the terms was one that provided for resolution
of disputes by arbitration.139 The Hills kept the computer beyond the thirty-day
deadline, but at some point they became dissatisfied with it and sued Gateway in
federal court.140 The district court refused to enforce the arbitration clause, and
Gateway appealed to the Seventh Circuit. In an opinion by Judge Frank
Easterbrook, the Seventh Circuit vacated the district court decision and remanded
with instructions to compel arbitration.141

See generally Roger C. Bern, “Terms Later” Contracting: Bad Economics, Bad Morals, and A Bad Idea For A
Uniform Law, Judge Easterbrook Notwithstanding, 12 J. L. & POL’Y 641 (2004); Mark Andrew Cerny, A
Shield Against Arbitration: U.C.C. Section 2-207's Role in the Enforceability of Arbitration Agreements Included
with Delivery of Products, 51 ALA. L. REV. 821 (2000); Stephen E. Friedman, Text and Circumstance:
Warranty Disclaimers in a World of Rolling Contracts, 46 ARIZ. L. REV. 677 (2004); Robert A. Hillman,
Rolling Contracts, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 743 (2002); William H. Lawrence, Rolling Contracts Rolling Over
Contract Law, 41 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1099 (2004).
134

135

Lawrence, supra note 134, at 1099.

136

105 F.3d 1147 (7th Cir. 1997).

137

Id. at 1148.

138

Id.

139

Id.

Id. The opinion does not state what steps the Hills took to obtain satisfaction from Gateway
before they filed suit, but it appears they made their case for avoiding arbitration less appealing by
filing it as a class action and by adding a RICO claim, something Judge Easterbrook apparently found
ludicrous. See id. (“They filed suit in federal court arguing, among other things, that the product’s
shortcomings make Gateway a racketeer”).

140

141

Id. at 1151.
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Neither Judge Easterbrook’s opinion in Hill nor his prior opinion in ProCD,
Inc. v. Zeidenberg142 explains clearly the precise mechanics of the contract formation
and incorporation of the written terms.143 Commentators have said that, under the
theory of the opinions, the seller’s offer is contingent upon the buyer’s agreement to
the terms that will follow (usually accompanying the product).144 Many of the same
commentators have attacked this theory, saying that it is inconsistent with both the
Uniform Commercial Code and the common law of contracts.145 Later cases have
split, with some following the Seventh Circuit’s reasoning in Hill146 and others
rejecting it and following the Third Circuit’s analysis in Step-Saver Data Systems, Inc. v.
Wyse Technology,147 which has emerged as the leading case against the inclusion of such
terms. In the 2003 revisions to Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code, the
drafters expressly declined to take a position on the issue, leaving it to the courts.148
Recently, in a case decided under Ohio law, a divided panel of the Sixth Circuit

142

86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996).

Judge Easterbrook’s theory appears to be that no contract was formed during the initial sales
transaction. Instead, the shipment of the goods constituted an offer, which the buyer accepted by
failing to return the goods within the specified period. See Hill, 105 F.3d at 1149; ProCD, 86 F.3d at
1452 (“vendor, as master of the offer, may invite acceptance by conduct”).

143

144 See, e.g., MURRAY, supra note 81, § 50 at 94; Lawrence, supra note 134, at 1102.
As Judge
Easterbrook stated, “A vendor, as master of the offer, may invite acceptance by conduct, and may
propose limitations on the kind of conduct that constitutes acceptance.” Hill, 105 F.3d at 1149;
ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1452.

See, e.g., Batya Goodman, Honey, I Shrink-Wrapped the Consumer: The Shrink-Wrap Agreement as an
Adhesion Contract, 21 CARDOZO L. REV. 319, 344-52 (1999); Thomas J. McCarthy et al., Survey: Uniform
Commercial Code, 53 BUS. LAW. 1461, 1465-66 (1998); Jeremy Senderowicz, Consumer Arbitration and
Freedom of Contract: A Proposal to Facilitate Consumers’ Informed Consent to Arbitration Clauses in Form
Contracts, 32 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 275, 296-99 (1999); Jean R. Sternlight, Gateway Widens
Doorway to Imposing Unfair Binding Arbitration on Consumers, 71 FLA. B.J. 8, 10-12 (Nov. 1997).
145

See, e.g., Schultz v. AT&T Wireless Servs., Inc., 376 F. Supp. 2d 685, 687 (N.D. W. Va. 2005);
O’Quin v. Verizon Wireless, 256 F. Supp. 2d 512, 513 (M.D. La. 2003); Bischoff v. DirecTV, Inc., 180
F. Supp. 2d 1097, 1100 (C.D. Cal. 2002); Westendorf v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 41 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d
(Callaghan) 1110, 1110 (Del. Ch. 2000); M.A. Mortenson Co., Inc. v. Timberline Software Corp., 998
P.2d 305, 313 (Wash. 2000).

146

939 F.2d 91 (3rd Cir. 1991). The case held that the contract was formed when the initial offer and
acceptance occurred and that the additional terms became part of the contract only if they met the
criteria for inclusion under U.C.C. § 2-207(2). Id. at 98

147

See U.C.C. § 2-207, cmt. 5 (2003) (stating that Article 2 takes no position as to whether courts
should follow Hill or Step-Saver).
148
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followed Hill and ProCD.149
While it is not the purpose of this article argue the merits of the competing
positions, the “circle of assent” doctrine would allow the Tennessee courts to
capture the benefits of the Hill and ProCD position while avoiding much of the
unfairness that critics attribute to it.
Proponents of rolling contracts make the argument that they are a
commercial necessity. As Judge Easterbrook stated in Hill:
Practical considerations support allowing vendors to enclose the full
legal terms with their products. Cashiers cannot be expected to read
legal documents to customers before ringing up sales. If the staff at
the other end of the phone for direct-sales operations such as
Gateway's had to read the four-page statement of terms before taking
the buyer's credit card number, the droning voice would anesthetize
rather than enlighten many potential buyers. Others would hang up
in a rage over the waste of their time. And oral recitation would not
avoid customers’ assertions (whether true or feigned) that the clerk
did not read term X to them, or that they did not remember or
understand it.
Writing provides benefits for both sides of
commercial transactions. Customers as a group are better off when
vendors skip costly and ineffectual steps such as telephonic
recitation, and use instead a simple approve-or-return device.
Competent adults are bound by such documents, read or unread.150
It can be argued that customers are protected against abusive terms in
standard form contracts by the doctrine of unconscionability. But unconscionability
is a blunt instrument.151 It is designed to deal with terms so egregious that a court
cannot in good conscience enforce them.152 It does not deal with the much larger
universe of terms that are merely unfair.
The “circle of assent” doctrine provides a method for dealing with rolling
contracts. Rather than simply saying that the term is part of the contract because it
was in the document sent to the purchaser and is conscionable, the court can engage
in a totality of the circumstances analysis and determine whether it really is fair to
149

See Higgs v. Automotive Warranty Corp., 134 F. App’x 828, 832 (6th Cir. 2005).

150

Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F.3d 1147, 1149 (7th Cir. 1997).

151

See Epstein, supra note 4, at 305.

152

See supra text accompanying notes 41-44.
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bind the customer to this term. For example, in a case like Hill, a court could
consider a variety of factors. The list might include such things as: (1) whether the
customer should have expected there would be an arbitration clause; (2) how much
time a buyer should spend reading the terms that come with a computer (presumably
less time than he or she should spend with an insurance contract and more than with
the terms that accompany a video game); (3) whether the arbitration clause gives the
seller an unfair advantage;153 (4) how difficult is it to get out of the deal (does it
require shipping a computer back to the seller, finding new insurance–and being
uninsured during the interim, or merely sending an e-mail to cancel a subscription);
(5) how prominent in the documentation the arbitration clause is; and (6) how easy
the language is for a person in the buyer’s position to understand.
Unilateral Amendments
Academic writers have not given unilateral amendments the attention they
have given rolling contracts, but the issue is at least as important. Standard form
agreements governing such ongoing relationships as credit cards, bank accounts,
brokerage accounts, and wireless communications now commonly have provisions
giving the party drafting the agreement the right to amend the agreement unilaterally
upon notice to the other party.154 These provisions serve a useful purpose. They
allow businesses to make minor changes in the housekeeping details of their
agreements at low cost and with minimum hassle to their customers. On the other
hand, there is a huge potential for abuse, and courts have countenanced some of the
abuse with surprisingly little complaint from consumer advocates.
In one case, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit upheld
the dismissal of a class-action Truth-In-Lending case because the bank had
retroactively amended the credit card agreement to provide for binding arbitration.155
This analysis itself would embrace a number of factors, such as whether the customer will have to
pay substantial fees to bring an arbitration, whether the arbitration panel is likely to be biased in favor
of the seller, whether the arbitration clause precludes class actions and, if so, whether this is fair in the
circumstances of this transaction.

153

In some cases, businesses have attempted to make unilateral amendments even without such
provisions in the original contract, taking the position that by continuing to accept the benefits of the
contract, the other party has agreed to the change. In Klocek v. Gateway, Inc., 104 F. Supp. 2d 1332 (D.
Kan. 2000), the court noted that Gateway had attempted to change the terms of the arbitration clause
in contracts already in existence by mailing all of its existing United States customers a copy of its
quarterly magazine, which contained a notice of the change in its arbitration policy. Id. at 1332 n.1.
154

Similarly, Campbell v. General Dynamics Gov’t Sys. Corp., 407 F.3d 546 (1st Cir. 2005), involved a large
company’s attempt to change its employees’ conditions of employment (requiring arbitration of
workplace disputes) by sending a company-wide e-mail. Id. at 547.
155

Lloyd v. MBNA Am. Bank, N.A., 27 F App’x 82, 84-85 (3d Cir. 2002).
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After some of the claims of the plaintiff class had arisen, the bank made the
amendment by giving the cardholders notice in the sort of mass mailing that most of
us throw away with the rest of the junk mail.156
In another case, the Texas Supreme Court allowed a credit union to escape
liability for improperly allowing approximately $49,800 to be transferred from a
depositor’s account.157 The depositor’s girlfriend had forged his signature to an
account change card adding her as a signatory to the account and then transferred
the funds to her account, in some instances making the transfers by telephone.158
While financial institutions are normally liable for losses resulting when they honor
forged signatures of their depositors,159 the Uniform Commercial Code provides that
the institution is not liable if the depositor fails to notify the institution of the forgery
within one year after the institution sends a statement from which the depositor
should have been able to realize the forgery had occurred.160 In this case, the
depositor notified the credit union approximately six months after the credit union
sent the first statement showing the girlfriend’s withdrawals,161 but the credit union
had amended the account agreement to provide that it was not liable unless the
depositor notified it within 60 days.162 The depositor had not expressly agreed to the
amendment, and he probably was not even aware of it. When he opened his
account, he signed an application that said he agreed to be bound by all rules,

Id. Interestingly, a Delaware statute specifically allows such amendments of existing credit card
agreements. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 5, § 952(a) (2005) (“Any amendment that does not increase the rate
or rates of periodic interest charged by a bank to a borrower…may become effective as determined by
the bank, subject to compliance by the bank with any applicable notice requirements under the TruthIn-Lending Act”).
156

This is particularly bothersome because a study by a major telecommunications provider concluded
that consumers who received a new contract in the mail with a cover letter stating that the new
contract would not change their rates or service “would stop reading and discard the letter” as soon as
they read that statement. See Ting v. AT&T, 319 F.3d 1126, 1133-34 (9th Cir. 2003).
Am. Airlines Emp. Fed. Cred. Union v. Martin, 29 S.W.3d 86, 90, 92 (Tex. 2000). A total of
$49,800 was transferred in fourteen improper transfers. Id. at 90. The court ruled that the credit
union was liable for four transfers totaling $5,300. Id. at 90, 99.

157

158

Id. at 89-90.

159

See U.C.C. § 4-401(a) (2004).

160

U.C.C. § 4-406(f) (2004).

161 See Am. Airlines, 29 S.W.3d at 90. The depositor denied receiving the statements. Id. It seems
likely that the girlfriend intercepted them.
162

See id. at 89.
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regulations, bylaws, and policies of the credit union, as then in effect or as later
adopted or amended.163 Some time after this, the credit union had adopted a new
account agreement reducing the time for notification to 60 days.164 It had not mailed
the depositor a copy of the agreement but had notified him that he could pick up a
copy at one of its branches or telephone the credit union to request that a copy be
mailed to him.165 The court held that by continuing to maintain his account with the
credit union, he had agreed to be bound by the amendment.166 The dissent would
have held that the depositor was not bound because the amendment was
inconspicuous,167 but the majority expressly rejected that argument.168
The Alabama Supreme Court turned things around and allowed the customer to
make a unilateral amendment deleting an arbitration clause.169 Robert and Margo
Rebar had a one year renewable contract with Cook’s Pest Control.170 The
agreement contained a provision mandating binding arbitration.171 After a year of
unsuccessful negotiations with Cook’s over termite damage in their home,172 the
Rebars were apparently contemplating litigation. The mandatory arbitration clause in
the contract presented a problem, but their lawyer, Thomas Campbell, was a leader
in the fight against arbitration clauses in consumer contracts.173 The contract was
coming up for renewal, and Campbell drafted an addendum to the customer service
agreement providing that the parties’ rights were no longer subject to mandatory

163

Id. at 96.

164

See id. at 89.

See id. at 102 (dissenting opinion). The majority opinion also indicates that the credit union “sent
account statements specifying the critical sixty-day time frame.” Id. at 96.

165

166

Id. at 96.

167

Id. at 99.

168

See id. at 96-97.
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Cook’s Pest Control, Inc. v. Rebar, 852 So. 2d 730, 732 (Ala. 2002).

170

Id.

171

Id.

172 See id. at 743 (dissenting opinion); Sierra David Sterkin, Comment, Challenging Adhesion Contracts in
California: A Consumer’s Guide, 44 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 285, 286 (2004).

See Terry Carter, ARBITRATION PENDULUM: Mandatory Arbitration Agreements, Once An Easy
Pass, Come Under More Scrutiny, 89 A.B.A.J. 14 (May 2003).
173
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arbitration.174 The addendum tracked the typical language that businesses put in their
unilateral amendment addenda, telling Cook’s, “Please read this addendum to your
Customer Agreement carefully as it explains changes to some of the terms shown in
the Agreement. Keep this document with the original Customer Agreement.” It
also provided that by continuing to “honor” the Rebars’ account, Cook’s
acknowledged its agreement to the terms of the amendment.175 Rather than simply
laughing at a good joke, the Alabama Supreme Court treated the case as a problem in
basic contract law. It said that Cook’s notice that the contract was up for renewal
was an offer, and the Rebars’ returning the notice with the addendum was a
counteroffer.176 By cashing the Rebars’ check and providing services after the
expiration of the initial term, Cook’s accepted the counteroffer, including the
provision eliminating arbitration.177 While the Rebar decision is clever and gives the
satisfaction of turning the tables on business, it is not a solution to the problem. If
the case were followed, businesses would have to increase their prices to pay for the
employee time spent guarding against dissatisfied customers trying to modify
agreements.
The “circle of assent” doctrine provides a rational way to deal with unilateral
amendments. In fact, the court can deal with the problem on two levels. The court
can apply the “circle of assent” test to the clause in the original contract that allows
the amendment, and it can apply it to the amendment itself. With respect to the
clause allowing amendments, the court should ask whether the customer should have
expected such a clause in a contract of this sort. If the customer should have
expected such a clause, then the clause passes the test. If the clause is one that the
customer should not have expected, then the court must determine whether the
clause was so prominent that the customer should have noticed it and refused to
enter into the relationship if it did not want to be bound by it. Then the same test
must be applied when the contract is amended. If the amendment comes in an
envelope that the customer would be justified in throwing away, thinking it to be
junk mail, the customer is still bound if the change is simply a minor housekeeping
detail. But if the change is something that changes the customer’s substantive rights,
such as the addition of an arbitration clause or a change in the interest rate on a
credit card account, the court can first look at whether the change was
communicated to the customer in such a way that the customer should have realized
See Consumers can amend mandatory arbitration clause, CONSUMER FIN. SERVS. L. REP., vol. 6, no. 14
(Feb. 3, 2003).
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See Cook’s Pest Control, 852 So. 2d at 733.
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Id. at 736.
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Id. at 737.
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that a change was being made and understood the nature of the change. Second, the
court can consider whether it is fair to require the customer to terminate the
relationship if it does not agree to the change.
Merger Clauses and the “Circle of Assent”
Businesses need to have enforceable merger clauses in their forms. Sales
representatives often make promises they are not authorized to make.178 Other
times, customers misunderstand what the sales representatives say.179 Less
frequently, but still often enough to be a problem, customers flat-out lie about what
they were promised.180 By making all of its promises in the contract documents and
having an enforceable merger clause, a business should be able to protect itself
against these problems.
But important as the merger clause is to the supplier, enforcing it is often
unfair to the customer. If a customer lays out good money on the basis of what a
salesperson tells him, it is usually grossly unfair to later tell him, “Tough luck; you
should have read the fine print.” As a result, courts have often bent the law to allow
consumers and small business owners to introduce parol evidence. Some courts
have held that an inconspicuous merger clause does not reflect the parties’
intentions;181 another held a merger clause ineffective because the signer did not
understand its effect;182 another held the merger clause ineffective because the
document was incomplete on its face; 183 and still another held that the contract itself

See JAMES J. WHITE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2.12 (4th ed. 1995)
(referring to “the seller’s effusive salesperson mak[ing] unauthorized representations” as a “classic
situation”).
178

See Robert M. Lloyd, Five Rules for Dealing with Guarantors, J. COM. BANK LENDING, at 36, 37 (Dec.
1988) (stating that guarantors often misunderstand terms of guaranties).

179

See id. (stating that many guarantors lie about promises by bank officers); Robert M. Lloyd, Making
Contracts Relevant: Thirteen Lessons for the First-Year Contracts Course, 36 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 257, 281-82 (2004)
(lawyers need to protect clients against perjury).
180

See, e.g., Seibel v. Layne & Bowler, Inc., 641 P.2d 668, 671 (Or. Ct. App. 1982); cf. Fairfield Leasing
Corp. v. Technigraphics, Inc., 607 A.2d 703, 706 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1992) (giving no effect to
inconspicuous jury waiver).
181

Sierra Diesel Injection Serv., Inc. v. Burroughs Corp., 656 F. Supp. 426, 428 (D. Nev. 1987) (signer
“did not understand that the integration clause meant that the representations of defendant’s
salespersons as to what the computer could accomplish might be nullified”).

182

L.S. Heath & Son, Inc. v. AT&T Info. Sys., Inc., 9 F.3d 561, 569-70 (7th Cir. 1993) (document did
not name specific products or their prices).
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“was not a final expression of the parties’ agreement.”184 And of course allegations
of fraud will usually get even a sophisticated party past a summary judgment based
on a merger clause.185
Stretching existing doctrine to reach a result the court thinks is just presents
its own problems. It increases the potential for litigation, creating more costs that
will be passed on to all the customers. One academic writer has argued, “For sellers
who wish to avoid incorporating statements by their sales agents into the contract,
the remedy is the proper selection, training, and supervision of sales agents and the
adequate informing of consumers.”186 This is, of course, naive. Anyone who has
been in business knows that the type of people who are attracted to (and successful
in) sales careers are enthusiastic and prone to overstatement, often to outright
lying.187 There are few businesses in which the economics of the business permits
the employer to monitor its sales personnel in such a way that it can prevent outright
lies, let alone exaggerations. And even where it is feasible, it only deals with part of
the problem. Although consumer advocates are often reluctant to admit it,
customers are often the cause of the problem. They misunderstand and then
complain when their expectations are not met.
If, as consumer advocates say they should, courts were to ignore merger
clauses in standard form contracts, sales people would not become more honest and
businesses would not monitor them better. The result would simply be that litigious
customers would win more lawsuits and businesses would treat that as a cost of
doing business, increasing prices for all their customers to cover the costs. Most
customers would continue doing what they do now when they feel they have been
cheated. They would take their lumps and get on with their lives. If there were any
winners, it would be the small minority of litigious people who sue in these
situations.188
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Morgan v. Stokely-Van Camp, Inc., 663 P.2d 1384, 1390 (Wash. Ct. App. 1983).

185 See, e.g., Shah v. Racetrac Petroleum Co., 338 F.3d 557, 568 (6th Cir. 2003) (under Tennessee law,
merger clause does not defeat fraudulent inducement or promissory fraud claim).

Michael I. Meyerson, The Reunification of Contract Law: The Objective Theory of Consumer Form Contracts,
47 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1263, 1315 (1993).
186

See DAVID KEIRSEY, PLEASE UNDERSTAND ME II 63-66 (1998) (describing “Promoter”
personality).
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And of course the big winners will be those who sue on baseless claims. Without a merger clause
to dispose of the case on summary judgment, businesses will often be forced to settle even baseless
claims. See Lloyd, supra note 180, at 257-60.
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The “circle of assent” doctrine offers a much better alternative. Under it,
whether the court will give effect to the merger clause depends on a number of
factors, including the prominence and readability of the merger clause, the
sophistication of the signer, and the circumstances under which the document is
signed.189 This gives the person drafting the form a tremendous incentive to disclose
to the other party that the promises in the document are all he gets, and if he wants
to have anything else included in the deal, he had better get it in writing. It allows
the drafter to tailor the clause to the needs of the situation. A lawyer drafting a form
that is going to be signed by unsophisticated consumers who are relatively likely to
be relying on important promises that the salesperson makes (or that they think the
salesperson makes) might include a clause that says, “The seller’s representatives
have made no claims, promises, or warranties about this vehicle except….” There
would then be a blank where the buyer would be required to write “NONE” in his
own hand and initial it. Such a clause should be effective in all but the most extreme
situations. It would also be an effective deterrent to over-enthusiastic sales
personnel. Knowing that the customer is going to be asked to sign such a provision
at the most crucial time in the deal would deter misrepresentations (fraudulent or
otherwise) more effectively than could any training program.190
There are of course downsides to such a clause. It would slow the
transaction, some customers might find it offensive, and if, it were not signed
(through oversight or otherwise), it might create a presumption that additional
promises were in fact made. So in many situations, a drafter might want to use a less
extreme clause, perhaps a merger clause in bold immediately above the signature line.

189

See supra text accompanying notes 63-116.

Such a clause should be effective even against claims of fraudulent misrepresentation. Although
courts have generally allowed fraud claims to circumvent simple merger clauses, see supra note 186,
there have been cases holding that a carefully-drafted merger clause, specifically stating that the signer
was not relying on representations and that it had made its own independent investigation was
effective against a sophisticated buyer. See, e.g., Danann Realty Corp. v. Harris, 157 N.E.2d 597, 604
(N.Y. 1959). Adding the additional step of making the signer fill in the blank in her own hand, should
make the clause effective against even an unsophisticated consumer, although the “circle of assent”
doctrine would allow the court to disregard the clause where justice demanded it.
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CONCLUSION
The “circle of assent” doctrine is an important development in contract law.
For most of the twentieth century, courts and academic commentators struggled to
find a way to protect consumers and others who signed form contracts. Their
solutions did little to improve the situation. Unconscionability led to frivolous
litigation and unpredictability as judges varied widely in their notions of what was
unconscionable and lawyers rolled the dice, hoping to hit on a judge whose
conscience was easily offended. At the other end of the spectrum, the UCC’s
requirements for certain provisions to be “conspicuous” created a mechanical test,
which, while giving predictability, did little to protect the weaker party.
The “circle of assent” doctrine provides a middle ground between these
extremes. It gives the drafter of a form contract an incentive to make the contract
fair and to warn the signer of what she is getting into. Tennessee courts have made
an important advance in contract law, and other states would do well to adopt it.

